In this paper we propose a new definition of competitive equilibrium for an exchange economy model over time. At each moment consumer is characterized by an initial endowment and by an utility function, which he adopts for choosing the better consumption that he can afford. The actions, the constrain budget and the preferences described by utility functions depend on the price vector, time and the instantaneous commodity holding. With reference to a finite continuous time period, assuming that in this marketplace the mean value of the aggregate excess demand is non-positive and measuring its principal activities only in terms of mean values, we treat this setting as a pure exchange economy and for it we give an existence result of such equilibria by means of variational methods.
Introduction
Factor time entries in most dynamic economy models for explaining the timepath of consumptions in according the growth of the population (see e.g. [3, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30] ). Therefore, at each moment the market consists of the agents and of the stock of resources actually present. This fact brought to consider the ratio between the rate of resources and the rate of consumption-production, both when the agents are regularly replaced with younger individuals and when the generations of agents are overlapped. For obtaining the dynamic equilibrium in these economies, various methods were adopted: asymptotic in [27, 28, 33] , perturbation and projection in [9, 24, 26] and algorithmic in [7, 8] . Moreover, contextually, the study of comparison among different models didn't be late to arise (see e.g. [4, 12, 18] ).
On the contrary our interest relapses on a short-time consumption. In fact, the time period considered is a continuous bounded closed temporal segment, whose length doesn't go over the life of any consumer. Moreover, during this period the agents don't change in identity and in number. The reason for considering a fixed set of agents rather than population is simply for establishing, in a given time period, what is the better point of satiety of the time-series of instantaneous optimal consumptions for each consumer.
Of course, also this economy model involves some compromises with realty: the attention is exclusively focused on consumers and the initial value of the amount of commodities coincides with that final of the given period; two conditions which can represent an acceptable compromise for the study of some type of phenomena, as for example the management of the renewable resources for a sustainable economy. Moreover this model is inspired from the well-know fact: each economic action is always reducible to simple and pure exchange.
In details, we consider an economic system such that at any instant of a continuous time:
1) each individual can buy or sell several quantities of commodities without influencing the relative prices (free competition);
2) each individual makes his decision separately from others (information is decentralized);
3) an eventual production process has only the function of replacing all those commodities in deterioration or undergoing destruction.
In this context, it is clear that the aim of each agent is not to maximize his utility instantly. This is why a discrete number of successes does not guaran-tee, in general, the optimal satiety at the end of period. Instead, the finality of the strategy pursued by agents is finalized toward maximizing, under the constrains of budget, the mean value of the utility in the given period. Therefore, in respect of the above economic justification, the principal activities will be considered in terms of mean values and in force of condition 3), which permit us to justify that the non-production in mean value does not imply the non-production in any instant (fact inaccurately contradicted in the recent paper [17] and long before mentioned in [5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16] for supporting the existence of a dynamic equilibrium for a pure exchange economy over time and currently proved in [32] ), we will define a new dynamic competitive equilibrium. Successively in Proposition 3.1, we will prove that such equilibrium, under some assumptions, satisfies Walras' law. Finally, by the variational approach, we will give a solution (Theorem 3.6) to the substantial economic question in according to the definition of dynamic economic equilibrium, that is, whether a time-dependent price vector exists such that:
− for each agent, a time-dependent consumption bundle vector exists, which maximizes the corresponding mean value of the utility in the given period;
− the mean value of the excess of demand is non-positive, in the given period.
To illustrate the actions and utility functions of our dynamic model we will make use of functions in the space of square summable function on the given period, which values in the l-dimensional Euclidean space. Recalling that this space is of infinite dimension, a further difficulty in determining economic equilibrium with respect to the static-case (see e.g. [1, 2, 11, 14, 25] ) arises from the lack of compactness of the vector-price set. In Ref. [14, 17] the authors confronted the lack of compactness by considering a suitable subset of the price set. In our case, also using a similar idea we will obtain, nevertheless, a more precise result. Indeed, we are able to give more precise information on the vector-price corresponding to the equilibrium.
Dynamic economy model: notation and assumptions
Let l ∈ N and T ∈]0, +∞[, and set T := [0, T ]. We shall use the letter f to denote both the measurable function t ∈ T → (f (1) (t), ..., f (l) (t)) and the equivalence class [f ] of all measurable function g : T → R l which are equal, almost everywhere, to f in T .
Now, define
and put, for short,
It is well known that ·, · is a scalar product on the vector space L and that L, equipped with this scalar product, is a Hilbert space. We denote by
the norm induced by the scalar product ·, · .
We suppose that in our economic system there are n agents (consumers or traders) labeled by a = 1, .., n. Agents do not change in number or identity during T . We assume that a market exists where, at each instant t ∈ T , the price of each good is established. At each instant t ∈ T , the individuals who trade quantities of goods change the framework of their bundle. More precisely, in our dynamic setting, a commodity bundle for the agent a is a function x a ∈ L + whose components x j a are related to the correspondent commodity j, for all j = 1, .., l. Every agent a initially has a commodity bundle, called initial endowment, and denoted by e a ∈ L + , which satisfies the following survivability condition:
Probably, for every a = 1, .., n, agent a is not satiated by his own initial endowment. He therefore starts exchanging goods with the other agents to obtain a more preferable commodity bundle x a ∈ L + , called consumption. The set of feasible consumptions related to the agent a is denoted by X a ⊆ L + .
In this context, competition prevails between agents. The preference of agent a, corresponding to the choice of the consumption x a , is measured, in utility terms, by a real function u a : [0, T ] × R l + → R, the so called utility function. Throughout this paper, we shall assume that, for each a = 1, ..., n, the function u a satisfies the following conditions
for all y ∈ R l + and for almost all t ∈ T ; d) there exists a constant ν > 0 such that
Moreover, in order to have the market regulated by Walras' law (see Proposition 3.1), we also assume the following further conditions α) ∇u a (t, y) = 0 for all y ∈ R l + and for almost all t ∈ T ;
Since the transactions are infinite, it is possible that, during the period T , a part of the aggregate quantity of a given commodity is no longer available because it goes bad with age or shows signs of a malfunctioning. In order to keep the intensity of the exchanges flow constant, a production process may supplement this missing commodity.
Thus, the symbol x a will denote the consumption bundle of agent a, comprehensive of that part of net output introduced during T for the above reasons. Now, let us define the price set P as follows:
Clearly, all the exchanges are mediated by a price vectorial function p ∈ P . We intend agent a's wealth in the period T as the mean value of the instantaneous wealths and the values of other commodity bundles in the same way. Agent a's consumption choices in the period T are submitted to the constrained budget. More precisely, the mean value of the wealth corresponding to the consumption x a cannot be greater than the mean value of the wealth corresponding to the initial endowment e a . Thus, we are led to maximize the mean value of the utility function u a on the set Moreover, the absence of production in the period T , that is the condition that at each instant t ∈ T and for each j = 1, ..., l the total amount of consumption of the good j is not greater than the total amount of the initial endowment of the same good, in this economy will be replaced by the following condition: each agent a manages his choices of x a ∈ M a (p) corresponding to the price vector p, in such a way that the mean value of the total consumption does not exceed the mean value of the total endowment:
The array E := {T , e a , X a , p, u a } n a=1 so realized in this model, with the obvious sense of the symbols, describes a Walrasian economy in the time period T . Clearly, during this period, consumption, production and redistribution of goods are allowed.
According to budget constraints, each agent pursues the maximization of the mean value of his utility in the period T . Then, in terms of mean value, the maximization problem assumes the following form:
Consequently, the dynamic competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economic market is so defined:
is a dynamic competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economic market with utility functions iff:
(p, x) satisfies condition (2).
This definition is very similar to that proposed in [17] (see also [15] and [16] ). The only, but fundamental, differences are in condition (2) and in the survivability condition (1) . Indeed, in [17] condition (2) is replaced by the pointwise version of the same, where the non production condition is imposed at each instant t of the given period. Clearly, this defines an equilibrium that satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.1, but not vice-versa. However, the following fact must be pointed out: our equilibria are found out as a solution of a suitable quasi-variational inequality, exactly in the same way as in [17] . Nevertheless, as we shall show in Remark 3.3, the solutions of this quasi-variational inequality might not satisfy the pointwise non-production condition, as required in [17] , while they always satisfy condition (2) .
Let us now compare the survivability condition (1) with one considered in [17] . In [17] , the following survivability condition (independent of (1)) was proposed:
for each agent a = 1, ..., n, there exists a good j ∈ {1, ..., l} such that e j a (t) > 0 almost everywhere in T . (3) Nevertheless, if (3) holds, the conclusion of Lemma 3.4 below, concerning the Mosco's convergence of a sequence sets of the type M a (p n ), might be not true as showed in Remark 3.5. Note the same Lemma was required also in [17] , but there condition (3) was assumed.
Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, we want to point out that we will be able to find an equilibria for our model where related vector price is constant during the given time period. This information was not given in [17] .
Main results: Walras' law and existence theorem
To avoid formal complication, we shall assume that the set of the feasible consumptions of each agent a is X a = L + . As noted in Section 2., the conditions α) and β) guarantee that the market is regulated by Walras' law: indeed, we have the following result:
Proof. Let (p,x) ∈ P × M(p) be a competitive equilibrium and fix a ∈ {1, .., n}. Arguing by contradiction, let us suppose that
Let j 0 ∈ {1, ..., l} and ε > 0. By the previous inequality one can find ε 0 > 0, such that, if we put
a (t) = 0 for almost all t ∈ T . Since from conditions a), b) and c) we have the continuity of the function
it then follows from condition β) that there exists
for all ε ∈ [0, ε 1 ], in contradiction with the fact that (p,x) solves (DP ). Consequently, the conditionx
a (t) = 0 for almost all t ∈ T cannot hold. So, the set {t ∈ T :x (j 0 ) a (t) > 0} has a non-zero measure. From the arbitrariness of the index j 0 , we conclude that {t ∈ T : x (j 0 ) a (t) > 0} has a non-zero measure for every j = 1, ..., l. From this and (4) it follows that,x a ∈ int(M a (p)). Since (p,x) solves (DP ), the previous condition implies that
where D is the differentiation operator with respect to the variables of L. From the above equation we obtain ∇u a (t,x a (t)) = 0 for almost all t ∈ T , in contradiction with condition α). Consequently, (4) cannot hold. Thus, from the arbitrariness of a, the conclusion follows.
In the following result, we show that the solutions of a suitable evolutionary quasi-variational inequality are competitive dynamic equilibria. It is to be noted that in the static case, the equivalence between the problem of finding competitive equilibria and the problem of finding solutions of a suitable quasivariational inequality was established in [2] (see Theorem 1 of [2] , for instance). Nevertheless, in the dynamic case, this equivalence does not hold in general. This is due to the fact that, for a dynamic competitive equilibrium (p,x) ∈ P × M(p), condition (2), which replaces the non production condition of the static case, does not imply, in general, that
Let us now introduce, for every j = 1, ..., l, the following price vectorial function:
, where
Moreover, we denote by S ⊂ P the convex hull in L of the set {p 1 , ..., p l }. It is well known that such a set is (finite dimensional) convex and compact. Let us also introduce the vector space F generated by the set {p 1 , ..., p l } and let F * be the dual of F . Clearly, dim F = dim F * = n.
To simplify the notations, we shall denote the function ∇u a (·, x a (·)) (where x a ∈ L + ) with the symbol ∇u a (x a ).
Theorem 3.2. Assume that the utility functions u
a : [0, T ] × R l + → R satisfy
conditions a), b), c). Moreover, assume that the pair (p, x) ∈ S × M(p) satisfies the following evolutionary quasi-variational inequality
n a=1 ∇u a (x a ), x a − x a L + n a=1 x a − e a , p − p L ≤ 0 for all (p, x) ∈ S × M(p).
(5)
Then, (p, x) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium, according to Definition 2.1.
Proof. Let (p, x) ∈ S × M(p) be a solution of (5). Testing (5) with (p,x) ∈ S × M(p), one obtains
In particular, if for each fixed j ∈ 1, ..., l we choose p = p j in the previous inequality, one obtains
In particular, if for each a ∈ {1, ..., n} we choose x a ∈ M a (p) and test the previous inequality with x = (x 1 , ..,x a−1 , x a ,x a+1 , . .,x n ), we have
., n and for all x a ∈ M a (p).
As is well known, the above inequality is equivalent to saying thatx a maximizes U a on M a (p) for each a = 1, .., n. Thus, (p,x) also solves (DP ). We conclude that (p,x) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium.
Remark 3.3.
Condition (2) has been derived from variational inequality (6) . It is natural to ask oneself whether it is possible to derive a point-wise, non-production condition from the same, that is This fact is false in general, even if variational inequality (6) holds for every p ∈ P . Indeed, consider the following example: assume n = 1, l = 2 and define e 1 (t) = (e 
1 (t)) = (1, 1) for all t ∈ T . Then, for any p = (p (1) , p (2) 
On the other hand, one also has Thanks to Theorem 3.2, to obtain a dynamic competitive equilibrium it is sufficient to find a solution of quasi-variational inequality (5). We shall establish the existence of such a solution in Theorem 3.6 below. The proof of Theorem 3.6 needs the following lemma Lemma 3.4 (Mosco's convergence). Let a ∈ {1, ..., n} and let {q k } be a sequence in P strongly converging to p ∈ P . Then
Proof. Let x a ∈ M a (p), and first suppose that
one has that, for some k 0 ∈ N, one has
Thus, in this case, to prove i) it is sufficient to choose x a,k = 0 if k < k 0 and
Then, from the survivability condition (see Section 2.), one has
we can choose a sequence {a k } in [0, 1] such that lim k→+∞ a k = 0 and
with k 0 ∈ N being large enough. After that, we put x a,k = 0 if k < k 0 and
Remark 3.5. In the proof of Lemma 3.4 we have exploited the survivability condition given in Section 2. We observe that, for the validity of the Lemma 3.4, this condition cannot be weakened. Indeed, consider the following example: assume l = 2 and put e a (t) = (e (1)
This contradiction shows that, in this case, condition ii) of Lemma 3.4 is not satisfied.
Theorem 3.6. Assume that the utility functions u
a : [0, T ] × R l + → R satisfy conditions a), b), c), d). Then,
there exists a pair (p, x(p)) ∈ S × M(p) satisfying the evolutionary quasi-variational inequality (5).
Proof. Let p ∈ S and consider the following variational inequality
where ·, · L n is the scalar product induced by ·, · L on the product space L n = n a=1 L, and
By conditions a), b), c), d)
, it is a simple matter to verify that the operator Φ : L n + → L n is strictly monotone, coercive and continuous (so, in particular, Φ is hemi-continuous, that is continuous from the line segments of L n + to the weakstar topology of L). Thus, from a classical result (see, for instance, Corollary to Theorem 3.1 of [31] ), the variational inequality (7) admits at least a solution x ∈ M(p). Actually, in view of the strict monotonicity of Φ, the solutionx is unique. Thus, one can denote this latter by x(p) = (x 1 (p) , ..., x n (p)) =x. Consider now the operator g : S → L, defined by
We claim that g is continuous, from the strong topology of S to the weakstar topology of L. Clearly, to prove our claim, it is sufficient to show that the function p → x(p) is continuous, from the strong topology of S to the weak-star topology of L n . To this aim, let {p k } be a sequence in S, converging to p ∈ S. Observe that from the monotonicity condition d) and since x(p) satisfies (7), one has, for all k ∈ N,
Therefore, the sequence {x(p k )} is bounded in L n . Since L n is a reflexive space, up to a subsequence we can suppose x(p k ) to be weakly convergent in L to some y. By Lemma 3.4, one has y ∈ M(p). Now, fix any z ∈ M(p). Again by Lemma 3.4, there exists a sequence {z k } in L, such that z k ∈ M(p k ) for all k ∈ N and lim k→+∞ z k − y L n = 0. At this point, note that, thanks to the monotonicity of Φ, we can apply Minty's Lemma. Thus, for each k ∈ N, x k (p) satisfies
In particular, choosing x = z k , one obtains
Then, from the arbitrariness of z and again from Minty's Lemma, we infer that
Thus, y is a solution of variational inequality (7) . By uniqueness, it follows that y = x(p) and so x(p k ) → x(p) weakly in L n , which proves our claim. At this point, note that, for each p ∈ P , the element
can be identified with the element ϕ(p) ∈ F * defined by
Now, since dim F * = n and, from what can be seen above, the map
is continuous, from the strong topology of S to the weak-star topology of F * , it follows that the same map is continuous from the strong topology of S to the strong topology of F * . Then, by a classical existence result for variational inequalities (see, for instance, Theorem 3.1 of [29] ) we findp ∈ S, such that
At this point, we can immediately check that the pair (p, x(p)) ∈ S × M(p) is a solution of quasi-variational inequality (5).
An example
We present a possible realistic situation in which the amount of the initial endowment is not constant in time.
Consider a market regulated, at each instant t ∈ [0, T ], by the Walras' law. Assume that the l commodities are l sustainable renewable resources and essential for the life of each agent. Fixed the initial instant t = 0, indicate by e a (0) = (e a respectively the initial endowment of agent a and the initial amount of the good j. Without a precise policy or a realization from the part of the consumers in sustainable field, assume also that for each resources j and for each instant t ∈ [0, T ] a part h j (t) of e (j) (0) has gone destroyed or is unserviceable (owing to the adverse weather conditions, the transport for the trade among the agents, because the extinction limit has been exceeded, ... for instance) and therefore it must be integrated. Clearly, we suppose that e (j) (0) keeps positive in the whole period [0, T ] and this implies that h j (T ) < e (j) (0). Moreover, note that the function h j (t) is constant in every subperiod where the market has no losses or decrease of the goods. After subtracting the amount h j (t), the market, probably, is no longer in an equilibrium condition. This leads the agents to find a new equilibrium corresponding to the new amount of the goods. To this end, the first step is to redistribute the new amount of the goods in order that the agents have a new initial endowment. To realize that, a possible way is to redistribute each good j in the same proportion as at the initial instant t = 0. Then, the agents start exchanging the goods until they reach the new equilibrium conditions. So, in this situation, the model proposed in this paper can be applied by choosing, for all a = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., l, e In this example, the data of problem are, besides the utility functions u a (t, x a ), the functions h j (t), j = 1, ..., l.
To exhibit an utility function satisfying the conditions a) -d) and α), β), introduced in Section 2, we can consider, for instance, the following CobbDouglas type utility function u a (t, x a ) = α(t)(
where, for each j = 1, ..., l, γ k (t) < 1.
Conclusions
In this paper, a new definition of equilibrium for a dynamical economic model was given. This definition involves the following condition: in the given time period, the mean value of the excess of demand must be non-positive. Thus, under this condition, we can say that our model concerns an economy where production, consumption and redistribution of good are allowed during the given time period, but, for each good j, the mean value of the total amount of the consumption of the good j is not greater of the mean value of the total amount of its initial endowment. An existence result of equilibria was established by means of variational methods. In particular, quasi-variational inequalities were the key tool for the proof of the main results. Also, we made a comparison with a similar model and the related existence result of equilibria proposed in [17] .
Finally, a realistic example which our model can be applied to was also presented. In this example, the quantities involved (initial endowments, utilities functions) were time-depending.
